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ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 11 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

(Burma)

63-09357

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. R.L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU  
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDAI

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I. G. USACHEV  
Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LCUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I said at our one hundred and sixth meeting that my delegation would give replies to some of the statements made at the one hundred and fifth meeting by the Romanian, Polish and Bulgarian representatives, and at the one hundred and sixth meeting by the Soviet representative. Today I should like to give those replies, and I propose to take up the statements in the order in which they were made. I might say first, however, that the whole effort of the Soviet bloc delegations has been to charge the West with bad faith as far as the scientific basis for our position is concerned. Indeed, at our last meeting the Soviet representative charged the West with deliberate perversion of scientific data to support its position (ENDC/PV.106, p.20). We believe that two points should dispose of this charge.

First, the West has published numerous volumes of scientific data and analysis which relate to its position, all freely available to any person of any country who would wish to read them. I submit that that is not the act of a country bent on distorting or twisting its scientific position to support a political stand. On that basis alone the Soviet allegations should be utterly rejected. Secondly, we have made numerous changes in our position on the basis of scientific developments which have been designed to meet the Soviet point of view. Those changes, I submit, are not the action of a State bent upon avoiding agreement.

In addition, our colleagues from the Soviet bloc seem determined to discuss a number of scientific and technical issues which, only a week ago, they charged the West wanted to discuss to delay agreement. I should like to state that we shall be perfectly willing to discuss any of those questions. We do not believe that plenary meetings of this Conference are the best place in which to discuss such scientific details. We would prefer to discuss those technical issues in the Sub-Committee or, better yet, with Soviet scientists. But since gross distortions of the United States technical position have been introduced in plenary, they must be replied to here.

Now to turn to the statement made by the representative of Romania on 6 March. He drew a number of conclusions on the basis of certain quotations which he read

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

from United States Congressional testimony. The purport of those conclusions was that the United States was now admitting that it had constructed its position upon "erroneous data" and that that testimony represented "explicit acknowledgement of large-scale distortions" (ENDC/PV.105, p.15). Those conclusions are in error.

To begin with, the problem which the United States, and the Soviet Union as well, faced early in test ban technical discussions was to determine how many earthquakes there would be in any one year above a given seismic magnitude equivalent to a particular yield of underground nuclear weapon tests. In 1958, as I made clear on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105, pp.18 et seq.), we attempted to solve that problem with the best data at hand. The Soviet Government, of course, collaborated in the use of those data and agreed with them at the 1958 Conference of Experts. The data were originally gathered in the period 1932-1936 on very large magnitude earthquakes.

In 1958, to work out the question of how many earthquakes might take place equivalent to or larger than a seismic magnitude equivalent to a given yield underground nuclear test, we had to perform two estimates. First, the number of earthquakes which occurred at lower magnitudes had to be extrapolated using the data available from large earthquakes. Secondly, the equivalence between a particular seismic magnitude and a given-yield nuclear test had to be worked out using the data from the then available underground nuclear tests. Only one -- I repeat, only one -- of those nuclear tests was available before the Conference of Experts, and the data from others were not available until early in 1959.

Therefore, while we are accused of using "obsolete" or "erroneous" data, it is clear that the best available data was used. As new data have become available, they have been used in an objective manner to make necessary adjustments and changes in the United States position. There have been no distortions of data, and all estimates and conclusions, as well as the data, were made available to the Soviet delegation to the test ban Conference.

Unfortunately, the representative of Romania made another statement to which I must reply. Using the old technique of comparing "apples" and "oranges", he tried to draw mathematical conclusions about the figure which he thought the West ought to be proposing for the annual quota of on-site inspections. He said the following:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"So let us proceed from the number of seventy-five unidentified seismic events" -- I repeat "seventy-five unidentified seismic events" -- "on the territory of the Soviet Union. In the past, when the starting point was 700 seismic events" -- I repeat, "700 seismic events" -- "a year on the territory of the USSR, the United States delegation asked for twelve to twenty annual inspections. What would be the corresponding number of inspections were we to start from the figure of seventy-five?"

(ENDC/PV.105, p.16)

He went on to state that it was just a question of plain arithmetic.

But of course he is asking us to compare the total number of seismic events and the former Western proposal on inspection in the one case as against the present estimated number of doubtful or unidentified events and the present Western proposal for inspections in the second case. Our figures on on-site inspection have in the past been related to the number of doubtful events rather than to the total number of seismic events. For example, our inspection proposal of from twelve to twenty on-site inspections was based on our estimate that there would be in the Soviet Union -- above the 4.75 seismic magnitude treaty threshold, which we were then proposing, and using an international system of detection stations, which we were then proposing -- about 100 doubtful or unidentified events annually. With a national system with increased capabilities for long-range detection, and with corrected figures for the number of earthquakes above a particular seismic magnitude equivalent to a given yield underground test, we now believe there might be some seventy-five unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union above a detection threshold of approximately 4.0 seismic magnitude. And so we proposed an inspection quota of some eight to ten inspections.

So much for the remarks of the representative of Romania. I should now like to reply to the statement made by the representative of Poland on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105). First, I should like to deal with a quotation which he repeated from a statement which Mr. Foster made on 1 March. In this case I feel the Polish representative may have been a victim of the problem of translation between languages. The quotation to which he referred was somewhat different in the French interpretation, which we presume he used, from what it was when stated originally in English by Mr. Foster. Mr. Foster said:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"It is, of course, obvious that the Soviet Union is able" -- and here is where the trouble comes, and I continue to quote -- "to know whether seismic events on its own soil are earthquakes, but, quite frankly, we are not."

(ENDC/PV.104, p.17)

Unfortunately, the French verbatim record of the meeting uses the words "to identify" in place of the English words "to know". The difference is obvious. For here Mr. Foster was speaking of the Soviet Union knowing what goes on on its own territory by being perfectly cognizant of where, when and how it conducts its own nuclear tests, and by being able freely to look at the site of any questionable event. On the other hand, the French word "identify" may have misled the Polish representative into concluding we were referring only to seismic instrumental means of knowing what was going on in the Soviet Union. We, of course, were not.

Second, and more important, is the argument which the Polish representative developed to try to show that the Western position on on-site inspection has no scientific basis because the West agreed two weeks ago to seven on-site inspections annually conditional upon Soviet acceptance of certain arrangements for on-site inspection. The Polish representative said:

"I can understand at a pinch that over a period of time the number could be reduced gradually from between 12 and 20 to between 8 and 10 taking as a basis the results of experiments carried out between the Rainier experiment and the Vela project, but how is it possible in a period of no more than four weeks to reduce the number from between 8 and 10 to 7 on the basis of new scientific data?" (ENDC/PV.105, p.30)

To reply: it is of course a matter of record in this Conference that the United States offered eight to ten inspections four months ago, on 7 November 1962, in a conversation between Mr. Dean and Mr. Kuznetsov, and not four weeks ago. However, the question of time is not really material. Rather, it is a question of the way in which the offer of seven inspections was made to the Soviet Union. We have carefully indicated to our Soviet colleagues and to this Conference that the offer of seven inspections was made contingent upon Soviet willingness to negotiate and to agree upon effective inspection arrangements -- arrangements which we have described to Soviet representatives.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We believe that, as inspection quota numbers are decreased, the effectiveness of each inspection as a deterrent to treaty violation becomes more important. To ensure the most effective use of each inspection in a quota number as small as seven, there must be agreement on arrangements which will maximize the deterrent effect of inspection. We have always believed, for example, that what is called "other-side choice" of events to be inspected is one effective way of helping to build maximum deterrent effect. Similarly, there are other ways in which the reciprocal or adversary aspect of inspection arrangements can ensure that a small number of inspections, such as seven, can be effective as a deterrent. It is those arrangements which we made clear to Mr. Kuznetsov at the time the figure seven was mentioned. It is our hope that we may soon receive a Soviet response on those arrangements.

Finally, there is the reply to the statement made by the representative of Bulgaria on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105, p.37). His deliberate distortion of a quotation from Mr. Dean's speech in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly last autumn cannot stand without correction. Mr. Dean said, in part:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain -- and I repeat, certain -- of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and in fact, have not even been detected -- simply not detected -- by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

What Mr. Tarabanov sought to prove by that statement was that the United States had detected and identified all United States underground nuclear weapon tests through instrumentation. Such a deduction is patently absurd. In the first place, Mr. Dean was speaking of the capabilities of national systems outside the United States. How that can be construed to apply to what the United States national systems can or cannot do within United States boundaries is difficult for me to say. Certainly it is not true that the United States seismic systems have the capability to identify, or indeed have identified, all underground nuclear explosions in the United States. That is just not the case. The truth is that in the United States a number of earthquakes can be identified every year by instrumentation, and a larger number of unidentified events can be detected. The seismic system alone does not tell us completely which events are earthquakes and which are not.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I should like to turn now to the statement of the Soviet representative at our meeting on 8 March. I already noted at that meeting those points with which my delegation can agree, and I again set the record straight on the unfounded charge that any official representative of the United States has proposed, either formally or informally, the number of on-site inspections which the Soviet Union is now proposing.

The Soviet representative repeated the charges which the Romanian representative made concerning the United States use of earthquake data. He charged that I had admitted "the authenticity of the facts cited by Mr. Macovescu" (ENDC/PV.106, p.20) That is of course incorrect. I merely stated that Mr. Macovescu's quotations -- I repeat quotations -- seemed to be accurate (ENDC/PV.105, p.18).

The Soviet representative then indicated that the Soviet Union had actually forecast the numbers of earthquakes which United States experts now agree will occur annually in the Soviet Union above a given seismic magnitude equivalent to a particular yield of underground nuclear tests. Actually, if the Soviet representative will examine carefully the chart submitted by Soviet experts and published as a portion of the Soviet Annex, Annex II, to the report of Technical Working Group 2 (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9), he will find that the Soviet experts predicted that the numbers of earthquakes, world-wide, equivalent to or larger than explosions of a given yield were some 1.9 to 3.3 times smaller than the number estimated at Geneva by the experts in 1958. The United States estimates for the one kiloton range under conditions of Rainier coupling are now close to those of the experts in 1958, while the Soviet Union's figures from the report of the Technical Working Group remain considerably lower. In addition, it was of course the United States which called for the Technical Working Group and which submitted almost all of the data. The Soviet Union in response, submitted little or no data of its own.

Here we believe the Soviet scientists may well themselves have made an honest error, and we are in no way impugning their integrity. Certainly, all figures in 1959 were estimates; but today we have empirical evidence on which to base our conclusions about the numbers of earthquakes equivalent to or larger than a given-yield underground nuclear explosion.

Turning now to the Soviet argument about inspections in aseismic areas -- in aseismic areas -- the Soviet representative said:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"... why inspect a territory if it is quiet and no earth tremors or seismic events occur there which could be confused with nuclear explosions? There can be only one reply -- the only purpose is to rummage in that territory and try to find out something that might be of interest to the United States Intelligence Service and the United States chiefs of staff." (ENDC/PV.106, p.23)

There is, of course, an excellent reason why the seismic portions of a country should be liable to inspection. If a suspicious event occurred in an area where there had been no earthquakes before, it certainly would be an event which ought to be looked at. More interesting is the fact that Chairman Khrushchev, in his letter of 7 January 1963, agreed with President Kennedy that an aseismic area ought to be open to inspection. Chairman Khrushchev wrote:

"Of course, the most expedient thing would be to hold inspections in seismic regions where the biggest number of unidentified seismic phenomena may occur. But if you do insist, we do not object to inspections in aseismic regions, too, provided they are held within the limits of the annual quota indicated by us." At this point we are in something of a quandary. We hope the Soviet representative will tell us whom we are to believe on this subject -- Chairman Khrushchev or Mr. Tsarapkin.

The Soviet representative goes on to expound his old and unproved line on national systems. On 8 March he uses an all too familiar technique when he attempts to confuse the words "detect", "control" and "verify" with the word "identify" (ENDC/PV.106, p. 25). There is no doubt that the United States, for its part, will place primary reliance for the detection of events in the Soviet Union on United States-operated stations. However, the United States will place primary reliance for the identification of selected doubtful events in the Soviet Union on on-site inspection. We recognize that there will be a number of detection networks. Under present conditions there will always be, however, a residue of detected but unidentified seismic events. National stations and national systems can and will ensure that the control system is effective in detecting suspicious seismic events; but it is only through on-site inspection that we can achieve reasonable assurance under the treaty that no clandestine tests are being or will be conducted.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

On the question of the various improvements in seismology which lie ahead of us and about which the Soviet representative has quoted extensively from Western sources on Western developments, there have indeed been some encouraging developments, which we reported to the Conference last July (ENDC/45); and also we have, of course, made improvements in certain of our laboratory instruments, such as the one mentioned by Mr. Tsarapkin which is being developed at the California Institute of Technology. We are working on many other projects in the field of seismology, and information on those will continue to be reported in United States official documents and in the public press of the United States as new developments are achieved.

We are disappointed, however, that the Soviet representative has been unable to tell us of anything which Soviet scientists have developed which could help us in our efforts towards a test-ban treaty. He has made large claims for the success of the Soviet seismic system, but he has never been willing to bring scientists here to discuss those claims. We can assure him, however, that we have taken fully into account all of the available work by reputable scientists in the field of seismology in our position on a test-ban treaty.

The Soviet representative also asked that we reply to a question from the representative of Czechoslovakia on the relationship between the composition of the personnel of inspection teams and the numbers of inspections themselves. We believe that the connexion is obvious. We believe that the teams must be composed so as to assure the most effective and efficient carrying out of inspections. Composing teams in a manner which permits self-inspection will only serve to make inspection useless. We wish to know whether the Soviet Union continues to insist on a composition of teams which would amount to self-inspection and which would therefore completely negate the deterrent effect of on-site inspections. We think that that is a simple and straightforward question, and that the Soviet representative's answer to it will materially affect the final agreement on the annual quota number of on-site inspections.

There is another matter which I should like to clarify. It is the role which technical information and scientific data play in determining the position of the United States on such problems as on-site inspections. We have spelt this out before. Our position is political in the sense that all decisions of the United States Government concerning acceptable provisions of the treaty are political decisions. It is scientific in the sense that we consider the technical situation very carefully in making up our minds on the various political decisions.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

On the specific issue of inspection of a test ban there would be no political aspect of the problem if we were going to inspect automatically each and every unidentified seismic event. It would then be only a question of launching the inspection on the basis of applying agreed objective criteria. However, once the decision was made to inspect only a portion of unidentified events, then a determination of the exact proportion to inspect became a political decision. We asked ourselves what degree of risk we should be taking with any given annual number of inspections. When I speak of risk I am, of course, referring to the danger that an insufficient number of inspections, or poorly-conducted inspections, would encourage a party to believe that some clandestine treaty violation could take place without disclosure.

A decision about the degree of risk that the United States would be ready to take depends on many factors. For example, we should naturally consider what incentives any party might have to attempt violations. We should think of how seriously our security might be threatened by nuclear-weapon developments that might be obtained by other countries through undetected clandestine underground tests. We should also pay attention to inspection questions themselves. We should want to know how effective each inspection was going to be. That would depend on agreement on sound and efficient procedures and arrangements for each inspection. We should give very close notice to the percentage of all unidentified events that was going to be subject to inspection, as a very direct measure of the risk involved. It is at that point, in particular, that the question of the number of unidentified seismic events comes into the picture. That is the reason why we have been insistent on having the best scientific estimates possible about the number of earthquakes detectable and identifiable.

Frankly, we do not see how the Soviet Union can fail to take similar factors into account; and indeed it appears to do so backhandedly when it claims that there will be no unidentified events, and hence no risk on abandoning on-site inspections, owing to the efficiency of national seismic-detection systems. However, we do not share that view and have seen no scientific evidence to support it.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I hope that what I have just said will give other delegations a better basis for understanding all the diverse political, organizational and scientific factors which go into United States thinking on on-site inspections; and I hope it will help to make clear why we think it essential to begin discussing the general arrangements on on-site inspections.

I wish to refer to just one more point. The Soviet representative said on 8 March:

"We cannot disregard the statement made by Mr. Stelle at one of our recent meetings to the effect that the United States sees no need to set any time limit for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. If effect he expressed himself in favour of an unending and fruitless discussion being carried on in the Committee."

(ENDC/PV.106, p. 31)

Mr. Tsarapkin is, of course, wrong in his summation of what I said — I believe he is referring to what I said at our private meeting. I indicated that we strongly believed that a test ban should be concluded just as soon as possible. I did say that we did not believe there was any one date after which we must automatically give up all hope and give up all efforts towards a treaty.

We shall continue to persevere in our efforts to reach agreement. If the Soviet Union will only consent to make its position clear to us, or even to begin to make its position clear to us, on the arrangements for on-site inspections, we are sure negotiation can begin immediately and we have high hopes that it would proceed towards early agreement.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I should like today to make on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation a few remarks on some of the questions connected with our negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. But before doing so, in view of certain remarks made by the United States representative in his statement this morning, I should like to dwell briefly on one circumstance which cannot be ignored.

The representative of the United States spoke, among other things, about the efforts of the delegations of the socialist countries, or, as he called them — the delegations of the Soviet bloc — to accuse the West of a lack of goodwill in the negotiations; he said that the socialist delegations grossly misinterpreted the position of the United States, and so on.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Mr. Stelle considers our remarks to be unfounded. He thinks that our doubts about the United States' real attitude towards a treaty are devoid of any foundation. I do not think this is so. We cannot fail, for instance, to draw attention to the campaign against an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests which is developing before our eyes in some countries, particularly in the United States.

The question naturally arises: Why and in whose interests is such a campaign being artificially fomented in the United States? Perhaps it is intended to serve as a cover for the United States' own ideas on the question of nuclear armaments, ideas which are contrary to our aims. Or is it intended to prepare American public opinion for the final failure of our negotiations, and to lay the blame on the alleged intransigence of the Soviet Union?

Why is all this done if our negotiations are far from being ended and if the objective conditions for the achievement of agreement still exist? I whose interest is it to create even now a psychosis of failure in regard to our negotiations? Is it in the interest of the socialist countries, as our Western colleagues have often asserted here? It seems to me that there is no need to quote numerous examples proving the sincerity of the socialist countries' desire to achieve agreement. The most convincing proof was the very fact of the Soviet Union's far-reaching concession on the question of on-site inspection, which was made exclusively for the purpose of facilitating our negotiations and creating favourable conditions for achieving agreement. However, we are again compelled to note with profound disappointment that the Western Powers not only do not fully appreciate this concession, but on the contrary often endeavour to depreciate it and to put it on a par with their own so-called concessions.

Thus there is bound to arise serious doubt whether the United States is ready at the present time to engage in any useful negotiations on the prohibition of tests, and whether the prospect of being deprived of the possibility of continuing tests without hindrance would suit its present military and political concepts. If it were merely a question of isolated statements opposed to the aims of our negotiations, we could disregard them. But it is a question of a campaign in which, as Mr. Tsarapkin showed at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.106, p.32), an increasing number of influential political personalities are taking part. This fact shows

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

that there are influential political forces in the United States which have again become active precisely in recent times, and which are vigorously opposing an agreement which would lead to a restriction of the feverish arms race and to the easing of international tension. This is a very disquieting sign which cannot fail to cause us concern.

Negotiations on a test ban have been going on for several years. During this time huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been accumulated and continue to grow. That in itself creates a serious threat to peace, because intensive nuclear armament has already reached such a degree that any military incident could develop into a thermo-nuclear war. If, in addition to this, we take into consideration that over \$ 120 milliard are at present being spent in the world on a senseless arms race, this should compel us to be really on our guard.

The extreme importance of our negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests becomes all the more obvious. It is quite clear that any progress in these matters is inseparably connected with the strengthening of confidence between States. Therefore, any step aimed at aggravating international tension is a step which in fact runs counter to all the efforts of the Eighteen Nation Committee, and we are bound to reject it resolutely.

We have come to Geneva, not because we have nothing to do at home, but with the sincere desire to conduct serious negotiations on general and complete disarmament and on a number of important and extremely urgent questions, among which is the conclusion of an agreement on the banning of nuclear weapon tests. Particularly in regard to this last question, which is now under consideration, we nourished great and not ill-founded hopes. The very positive step taken by the Government of the Soviet Union to meet the position of the Western Powers created more favourable conditions for achieving agreement than had ever existed before, and this was duly appreciated by the majority of the delegations present here.

The flexible approach and initiative of the Soviet Union on the question of automatic seismic stations, and in adopting the principle of on-site inspection, provided additional guarantees of control over the observance of the obligation to cease all nuclear weapon tests. This was an important step which should have facilitated politically the rapid conclusion of an agreement.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Now, however, more than a month after the resumption of the negotiations, we are compelled to note with regret that the expected results have not been achieved and that the negotiations have again reached an impasse. The delegations of the Western Powers are in fact blocking the negotiations by stubbornly insisting on their new and unacceptable demands regarding the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations, as well as by trying to lead the negotiations into a discussion of technical and administrative details connected with the dispatch of inspection teams and the use of automatic seismic stations, before agreement has been reached on the fundamental question of their number.

I am bound to say that this action by the Western Powers is distinctly at variance with what they were saying last autumn. Then they kept assuring us that, if the Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspection, it would be possible to achieve an agreement within a few weeks. Characteristic in this respect is, for instance, the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on 5 December 1962, which has already been quoted here in another connexion. The representative of the United Kingdom said then:

"But what I am saying is that, if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963". (ENDC/PV.37, p.3)

That, like other similar statements, shows clearly that last autumn the Western Powers appealed to the Soviet Union to go back to the position it had taken until November 1961 on the question of on-site inspection. My delegation has already quoted several other statements made by the representatives of the United States and the representatives of the United Kingdom on this question which testify that, in agreeing at the end of last year to the carrying out of two or three on-site inspections a year, the Government of the Soviet Union fully accepted the demands put forward up till then by the Western Powers.

Today, however, I should like to dwell upon the aforesaid statement of the representative of the United Kingdom for another reason. At the time -- that is, on 5 December 1962 -- the representative of one of the Western nuclear Powers assured us that, if the Soviet Union agreed to the number of on-site inspections which

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

the Soviet Government had accepted up to November 1961, an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests could be signed within the two or three weeks remaining before the end of 1962.

It is in the light of those assurances that my delegation looks at the present situation in our negotiations. Three months have elapsed since the Soviet Government announced that it was prepared to accept the number of on-site inspections demanded by the West; it has agreed to two or three inspections a year. Notwithstanding this, however, not only has agreement not been reached on the basis of this step of the Soviet Government but, on the contrary, the Western Powers are now creating new obstacles to the achievement of an agreement and are putting forward new unfounded demands, thus creating further delays. We have already pointed out the ... that, as a result of this behaviour of our Western colleagues, the favourable opportunities for the achievement of an agreement created by the Soviet Union's flexible approach will be ... unused and will be missed. It becomes increasingly clear that this danger is very real.

Despite a definite rapprochement on most of the fundamental questions connected with ensuring reliable and effective control, the dispute which the Western delegations have artificially brought about over the number of on-site inspections has made it impossible up to the present to overcome the obstacles still blocking the way to the achievement of an agreement. The delegations of the socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out that the Western Powers' unacceptable demands in regard to the number of inspections lack any scientific basis. The arguments now being put forward in our negotiations confirm this fact. First of all, the demand for an annual quota of inspections is itself a question which, in our opinion, is based on political and not scientific prerequisites. This fact is confirmed even more strikingly precisely by the attempts to make the annual inspection quota dependent on the composition of the inspection teams, in respect of the nationality of their members, as well as on the question of who will take the decision to dispatch the inspection teams, and so on. It is obvious that all these aspects are exclusively political.

On the other hand, from the scientific and technical point of view it is being more and more cogently confirmed that there is no need for on-site inspection to ensure reliable and effective control. Ever-increasing recognition is being given to the position adopted on this question by the delegations of the socialist countries: namely, that in order to ensure reliable and effective control it is

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

quite sufficient to rely on the existing networks of national stations which various States possess and on the data from them which would be transmitted for processing and assessment to a competent international organ.

This is the very principle on which the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) was based. The Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, also helped to make clear on 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, pp.25 et seq.) the significance of the use of national stations as a basis for a control system. The importance of these stations was also confirmed in the statements made by several other delegations.

In this connexion an important place is also occupied by the draft proposal (ENDC/73) for the use of automatic seismic stations as a means whereby it will always be possible to verify and check to what extent the national stations are functioning reliably and accurately. Thus the controlled networks of national stations would undoubtedly provide the necessary prerequisites for ensuring such reliable and effective control as would prevent any State from evading an agreement on the prohibition of tests and carrying out clandestine underground nuclear explosions. Control by means of automatic seismic stations over the functioning of national posts would ensure a completely reliable control system. This system could make full use of the data furnished by the control posts of all countries, including those on whose territories the relevant events have occurred, and would not depend solely on data from control stations situated at a great distance on the territory of another nuclear Power.

If it is possible to verify reliably, by means of automatic seismic stations, the data received and furnished by national stations, then obviously a system based on the networks of existing national stations and supplemented by several automatic stations can ensure effective control over the observance by all States of their obligations under an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

We gained the impression that, in his statement on 22 February, the United States representative said that the United States was prepared to rely for control on the data furnished by national networks of control posts (ENDC/PV.101, p.42). However, his subsequent statements, including the statement he made this morning, as well as the statement of Mr. Fisher, Deputy-Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the effect that the main method of detecting events in the territory of the Soviet Union should be to use United States national stations manned by United States personnel and situated outside the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.106, p.29)

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show that in this regard the United States continues to adhere to a position which, in our opinion, does not take into account the present situation or the new possibilities which are being opened up through the use of automatic seismic stations.

In the past the United States refused to use data obtained by the control posts of other States, including the Soviet Union, alleging that there was no guarantee of their reliability or authenticity. Now, however, we think that this objection no longer arises, since automatic seismic stations would provide a full guarantee of the reliability of such data. Despite this, however, the United States, by putting forward demands for a greater number of on-site inspections, is in fact trying to throw doubt on the reliability of a control system based on national stations.

United States representatives often speak about using scientific and technical data in determining the United States position on the question of control. We are therefore surprised that they should refuse to take into consideration precisely these new facts, which in our opinion are very important and which are based on unquestionably scientific and technical conclusions regarding the possibility of using the national control systems of various States, supplemented by a number of automatic seismic stations which would verify the work of the national systems. In our opinion the reluctance of the United States to take into account these generally-recognized scientific conclusions is being used by it to justify its demands in regard to the number of on-site inspections.

I should now like to dwell briefly on another question which our negotiations encounter. I refer to the demand which is being constantly put forward by the Western Powers that the Committee should now enter into a discussion on technical, organizational and administrative details relating to the dispatch of inspection teams and the installation of automatic seismic stations before agreement in principle on their number has been reached. My delegation has already stated its views on this demand in our earlier statements. We have said that in our opinion it was necessary to settle the main question first, namely the question of the number of inspections, because its settlement would create a good point of departure for negotiations on specific technical, administrative, organizational, financial and other questions. The reverse procedure which the Western Powers propose would, in our opinion, be a formal one and would lead to further delays.

The behaviour of the Western delegations at our recent meetings has convinced us of the correctness of this point of view. In particular I have in mind the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, at our 105th meeting

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and the statement he has made today, which in our opinion has fully confirmed that the procedure proposed by the Western Powers would in no way move our negotiations forward or contribute to any progress. In his statement on 6 March, Mr. Stelle referred (ENDC/PV.105, p. 21) to a number of questions which, in the opinion of the United States, must be discussed before agreement can be reached on the annual inspection quota.

Even a cursory look at the problems mentioned by Mr. Stelle shows what results could be expected from their discussion. These problems are not new: all these problems were the subject of discussions between the nuclear Powers practically during the whole of the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests which went on in Geneva for over three years. It is well known that these negotiations led to no results. Now attempts are being made to have these questions discussed again; moreover, it appears that the Western Powers are maintaining the same position which for three years prevented the achievement of agreement.

What results could such a discussion lead to now? Can we really expect the results to be any different from what they were in the past, since the delegations of the Western Powers, in particular that of the United States, are now stating quite categorically that in regard to the fundamental question -- the number of inspections to be carried out annually -- they have no intention of agreeing to the figure proposed by the Soviet Union, which in the autumn of last year they themselves considered sufficient?

We see no use in discussing, not the main issues which are of decisive significance for bringing about the conditions for a possible agreement, but questions which, by their import and content, are of a secondary nature and the discussion of which would not bring us any closer to our goal in the absence of agreement on the main decisive questions. As long as our Western colleagues are opposed to reaching agreement on the main questions, we must look critically on all attempts to concentrate discussion on technical problems.

Before concluding, I should like to make a few more remarks. As I indicated in my last statement (ENDC/PV.104), our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests are not taking place in a political vacuum, nor are they just a matter of negotiating technique. In our view it would be very illusory to attempt to divorce these problems from their political aspects, as the representative of Italy appealed to us to do on 8 March (ENDC/PV.106). We realize that our colleagues from the Western countries are trying to deprive the negotiations precisely of this political aspect. We must face the fact that the reasons for the present difficulties in our negotiations are exclusively political.

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We have already stated our view that the position of the United States, for example, on the question of the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations is determined by military, strategic and political considerations (ENDC/PV.104, pp. 12, 13). If that were not so, and if the United States were really only striving to reach agreement on measures to preclude the possibility of clandestine explosions, our negotiations would have long ago overcome their standstill and would have come closer to a successful conclusion. Some of the more soberly reasoning circles in the countries of the West are also gradually coming to the same point of view. For example, on 8 March 1963 the British newspaper The Guardian, in an editorial on the Geneva negotiations, said among other things:

"It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the American position is based more on political than on technical grounds."

It is not difficult to surmise what are the political factors determining the United States inflexible position on the question of the cessation of tests. The resumption of underground tests in Nevada, and the feverish efforts to equip NATO with strategic nuclear weapons, show that the United States and its chiefs of staff are evidently placing their military and strategic plans above the common vital interests of the peoples of the whole world. Apparently they regard an agreement on the cessation of tests as an obstacle in the way of expanding their nuclear arsenal and perfecting their nuclear weapons, including those which are to be placed in the hands of their allies, particularly West Germany, within the framework of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force.

The representative of Italy, speaking on 8 March, again took the opportunity to defend this policy. He even expressed the view that the NATO multilateral force was intended, among other things, as a means for effectively preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.106, p. 6). But this assertion, as well as the assurances of the peaceful purposes of the alliance between the West and the Federal Republic of Germany, and of the latter's faithfulness to the obligation it assumed in 1954 not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, seem to us in the light of political reality very unconvincing. In a recent press conference in Bonn, the West German Minister of Defence, Mr. von Hassel, speaking of the results of his trip to Washington, said that West Germany, by being admitted to this multinational group along with Britain, France and the United States, would move a long step toward joining the "nuclear club" of nations. Mr. von Hassel also stated, according to The New York Times of 8 March 1963, that "he had achieved a significant concession in Washington on atomic weaponry for West Germany".

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World public opinion is seriously concerned about the development of nuclear weapons and the dangerous consequences which would follow further improvements in weapons of mass destruction and the spreading of these weapons within the framework of NATO, in particular to West Germany. Its warning voice testifies to the insistence with which the peoples of the entire world are demanding that an immediate stop be put to the feverish arms race and to the nuclear contamination which is being spread by the United States through plans to equip its allies with nuclear weapons. How public opinion in Western Europe regards these plans for the creation of a so-called multilateral force is shown, for example, by the establishment in France of a "National League against the Striking Force", which recently published an appeal signed by sixty persons eminent in the public and cultural life of France, including Mr. Jules Moch, who is well known to us here. That appeal includes the following statement:

"The multilateral nuclear force carries with it the danger that nuclear weapons will spread and, in particular, the possibility that nuclear weapons will be placed at the disposal of Germany despite the fact that the production of such weapons by Germany is prohibited under the 1954 Treaty."<sup>1)</sup>

That is the real background of the present Western position in the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests. Behind the intransigence of the United States on the question of the number of on-site inspections is to be seen the lack of political readiness to assume at the present time the obligation to put an end to the nuclear armaments race and to the spread of nuclear weapons. In our opinion it will be possible to cut the Gordian knot of our present difficulties in regard to the number of inspections if the Western Powers, and in the first place the United States, enter into negotiations with due regard for the interests of the whole international community. This prerequisite will open the way to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

The socialist States sincerely desire such an agreement. They are paving the way to it at the price of substantial concessions to the Western position. They want an agreement for all time, a fair and mutually-acceptable agreement. The Czechoslovak delegation considers that the favourable opportunity for such an agreement has not yet been lost. But we do not conceal our fear that, if our Western colleagues persist in their present attitude, our negotiations may come to a situation from which it will be difficult to find a way out.

<sup>1)</sup> Translation from Russian.

Mr. BURNS (Canada) In the opinion of the Canadian delegation, the speech by the representative of Czechoslovakia to which the members of this Conference have just listened does not break any new ground. In fact, we have heard most of the arguments before, and they have been replied to by delegations from the West, and no doubt will be replied to again. The one encouraging thing that Mr. Kurka said was that the socialist delegations had an earnest desire to have serious negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapon tests, and that they had well-founded hopes that those negotiations would be successful. I believe that that is the gist of what Mr. Kurka said in the early part of his speech.

Many of us here have been wondering why the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have come to a halt -- or perhaps we might even say, why there is no negotiation. The Canadian delegation has been disturbed by that standstill, and so have most of the other delegations here, and they have said so.

When we resumed our discussions on 12 February we were hopeful that, in spite of the failure to reach an agreement in New York, we should see a real negotiation in Geneva and eventual agreement. I do not need to tell members of this Conference what has happened instead. When I say that we were hoping for a real negotiation, those hopes were based on the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy on 19 and 28 December 1962 and 7 January 1963. In particular, the last sentence of Chairman Khrushchev's letter of 7 January stated:

"... the meetings between our representatives should lead in the very near future to agreement being reached on outstanding questions, so that when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its work our representatives" -- that meant both the Soviet Union and the United States representatives -- "will be able to inform it that the way lies open to agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests."

(ENDC/73, p. 9)

Reading through the paragraphs in that letter on the location of the automatic seismic stations, we see what seems to be a readiness to discuss that problem in a very reasonable way -- in short, to negotiate upon it -- and even the more difficult question of the number of on-site inspections is not presented as if two or three inspections were the absolute limit of Soviet Union concession. That would seem to be especially significant in view of Mr. Kennedy's very clear statement in the second

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paragraph of page 2 of his letter dated 28 December (ENDC/74) to the effect that the United States thought that between eight and ten on-site inspections were necessary and that he hoped to see some movement from the figure of two to three on-site inspections which the Soviet Union had indicated as being acceptable some time previously. Canada, like the other nations represented here, welcomed that move of the Soviet Union to agree in principle to on-site inspections.

However, we are unable to understand why, once the principle of on-site inspections has been accepted, details cannot be discussed. The representatives of the Soviet Union have suggested in other contexts that after agreeing on a principle it is normal to discuss its application. Well, the principle of on-site inspection has been agreed upon, and the number of such inspections is a matter of the application of that principle. And in this matter of on-site inspections especially, why is there a refusal to move to any higher digit than three? What creates even greater difficulties at the moment is the refusal of the representative of the Soviet Union to discuss anything else until the United States and the United Kingdom accept that arbitrary figure of two to three on-site inspections.

It is possible that the Government of the Soviet Union and its representatives may feel that they have been misled in this matter and had really been given by Mr. Dean to understand that two to three on-site inspections would be a token arrangement and that that would be everything required to make final agreement possible. It seems, at any rate, that there must have been a misunderstanding between Mr. Dean and Mr. Kuznetsov. It is difficult, however, to see how that misunderstanding can have persisted after the point was clarified in the President's letter of 28 December to which I have already referred. The misunderstanding is very unfortunate, but we do not think that past misunderstanding should be allowed to prevent negotiation for an agreement which both sides profess to desire sincerely.

There is another possibility, of course, and that is that the Soviet Union is not prepared to depart from its present position on the number of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations without a concession in some other field -- for example, in relation to some of the measures preliminary to disarmament which it has laid before the Conference for discussion. If that should happen to be the case, the Canadian delegation must say with all respect that it is an unfortunate attitude for any country to adopt. When the nuclear Powers are so close to agreement on a means

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of stopping nuclear tests, which nearly every country believes would be to the advantage of the nuclear Powers as well as a great relief to the whole world, to halt negotiations at this point would be to court final failure, and would entail a great deterioration in the possibilities of disarmament and peaceful understanding between the nations; whereas the successful conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests would lead to a lessening of tensions, increased international confidence and a better atmosphere for negotiation on general and complete disarmament and tension-reducing measures preliminary to it.

I must confess also that I cannot see why if, as Mr. Tsarapkin alleges, the Soviet Union could agree very rapidly to all the technical details on which the United States delegation has asked for clarification after the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed on the low number of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations stipulated by the Soviet Union, the Soviet position on these other matters could not be demonstrated beforehand. It would seem to the Canadian delegation that, if you want someone to agree with you on one point, it would be good negotiation to demonstrate what a good bargain they can get on other points. The refusal of the Soviet Union to give any details on those other points, however, leads one to fear that, even if the United States and the United Kingdom should agree to the arbitrary figures of two to three on-site inspections and three automatic seismic stations, they would find that the position of the Soviet Union in regard to the criteria for inspections and the means of carrying them out would not be acceptable and that we should still be as far away from agreement as ever. If the Soviet positions on those matters are as reasonable as Mr. Tsarapkin seems to promise, why cannot they be shown to the Conference?

The Canadian delegation has not brought these considerations forward for any other purpose than to try to find out why further progress is being blocked and why we must remain in this position of Tantalus -- the water of success so close to our lips but withdrawn by some god whenever we hope to drink.

In conclusion, I should like to quote a part of the statement of the representative of Romania on 6 March when he said

"... there should be no victor and no vanquished in this Conference.

The point is not to undermine the prestige of one country or another, of one government or another. The point is that we have to find

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together the best solution for the intricate issue facing us today, but in order to achieve that goal all the Governments represented here must give proof of their courage to take action and of their determination to solve the problem." (ENDC/PV.105, p.17)

I do not pretend to agree with most of what the representative of Romania said in his statement, including the two sentences which follow the quotation I have just made, but I do agree with what he said in that quotation, and I feel that we should try to respond in that manner and, looking afresh at the situation before us, move from the rigid position which in essence has remained the same ever since we resumed here on 12 February.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): I generally hate to exercise my right of reply, because I think the purpose for which we are gathered here is not to score debating points but to make progress in our negotiations. I should, however, like to take up one point in the statement made this morning by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle. At the outset, may I say that I will study his speech very carefully? There are many points in his statement which I should like to deal with at one of our coming meetings. It seems to me that he has dealt with several important problems which require further study and clarification.

At the present time I want to make only one point, in connexion with his suggestion (supra, p.7) that I may have been the victim of an erroneous translation from English into French. As a matter of fact I had quoted from the French verbatim record. It is true that in the English verbatim record the word "know" is used instead of "identify", as in the French record. The whole of the sentence I was quoting -- and I shall now quote from the English verbatim record -- runs as follows:

"It is, of course, obvious that the Soviet Union is able to know whether seismic events on its own soil are earthquakes, but, quite frankly, we are not." (ENDC/PV.104, p.17)

It seems to me that it is impossible to accept the implications which the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, is reading into the difference between the words "know" and "identify". It seems to me that one usually knows by identifying, and one identifies in order to know. In any case, if one wished to follow the logic of the argument put forward by the representative of the

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United States this morning, one might say that of course the Soviet Union is able to know what is going on on its territory; and I take it for granted also that nobody has ever attempted to carry out a clandestine underground nuclear explosion in the Soviet Union without the Government of the Soviet Union knowing about it. I assume that that must also be true for the United States.

But it is hard to believe that that was precisely the point that the United States representative wanted to make. It seems obvious to me that Mr. Foster, when he used that sentence, was assuming that the Soviet Union possessed a sufficiently large network of seismic stations, properly equipped, in order to be able to identify all seismic events occurring on its territory. I cannot believe that the United States representative wanted to make a different point. That, I think, would not be doing justice to the intelligence of the United States delegation, or to the intelligence of its spokesman Mr. Foster.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In exercising my right of reply, my first duty is to thank the United States representative for applying certain very kind epithets to the representative of Bulgaria in our Committee in his speech of today. He was polite enough to use (supra, p.9) the term "absurd" and certain other epithets which are certainly quite consistent with the language we are beginning to employ in our discussions. We shall not fail to study this language and to use it in future in our own speeches.

A second and very important point is one which Mr. Stelle referred to at some length and which I should like to raise again now. This concerns the conclusions which should be drawn from the statement of the United States representative in the First Committee, a statement which you will recall was quoted by the United Kingdom representative (ENDC/PV.103, p.28), and today by the United States representative (supra, p.9), to prove that the national systems, that is to say those of other countries, are not capable of detecting and identifying doubtful events occurring in another country, especially if it is a distant one. In this connexion the representative of Poland, exercising so to speak his right of reply, has just drawn the same conclusion as we have drawn from Mr. Dean's statement, on the basis of another statement of representatives of the United States and of other countries, notably the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

But allow me to recall the quotation made in English by the United States representative. Since he has not placed me "in the same bag" as the representative of Poland by saying that I had quoted an inaccurate French interpretation, I shall give the French translation because it is easier for me. What did the United States representative say according to the verbatim record of the First Committee of the United Nations? His statement was as follows:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries" -- I repeat 'in other countries' -- "have recorded certain" -- and I repeat, 'certain' -- "of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified" -- he said 'identified' -- "as nuclear explosions and in fact have not been detected -- simply not detected -- by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

I think that the members of the Committee present here will understand what is implied by the statement that certain events which occurred in the United States were not detected or identified by the stations and networks of other countries. They were not identified and detected by the systems and networks of the other countries, but they were by the United States system, which is expressly excluded here.

I do not wish to associate myself with the United States representative's conclusion that the networks of other countries were unable to detect and identify these events. No, I do not agree with that conclusion. The mere fact that in several of their recent speeches the United States representatives have stated that their system of detection and identification was based on the United States system means that the United States relies on its own system for identifying any given event. That is enough to prove that it is not correct to say that national systems are unable to identify these events.

However, let us turn to the other conclusion which must be drawn. We are now at a stage in our discussions when we have linked together, or when the course of debates has led us to the conclusion that we should link together, the systems of all the States in the world. Mr. Lall, the representative of India, mentioned this a few days ago. As you will recall, he stated that the delegations of the nuclear Powers were wrong in not linking all the systems together, including not only those of other countries but also the system of the country in which a doubtful event is presumed to have taken place. Thus the scientific centre responsible for detection

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and identification and for drawing the necessary conclusions would have at its disposal information supplied by the system of the actual country where the event had taken place.

The United States claims that when it made certain nuclear tests, other countries did not detect or identify those tests, but it certainly did so itself. It was at a time when the United States wished to prove that the national systems of the individual countries were inadequate. But we are now at a different stage in our discussions, and Mr. Dean's statements have shown that the United States system has the necessary ability, whereas, according to the United States representative, the Soviet system lacks that ability -- though I doubt whether he is correct in this contention.

We have thus reached a stage when, by pooling all the data obtained throughout the world -- data furnished by the system of the country which is concerned in identifying a certain event, data from all the countries surrounding the country where the doubtful event has taken place, and data furnished by the system of the country where the event has taken place -- it should be possible to identify all events. As the United States is able to identify doubtful events, there is no reason to suppose that the same does not apply to other countries. I do not believe that the United States, which has, as you will recall, produced such erroneous data -- it was the United States representative who described them as such (ENDC/PV.105, p.14) -- on so many events in the past, can say that the Soviet Union would not be able to identify doubtful events in its own territory.

I therefore once again urge representatives in this Committee to re-read this passage in Mr. Dean's speech (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26) and the quotation which the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, has made today (supra, p. 9) in order to consider what conclusions can be drawn from the mere fact that the United States has the ability to identify these events.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America) Both the representative of Poland and the representative of Bulgaria have taken exception to what I have said about statements made by representatives of the United States and about what they said about statements made by representatives of the United States. I should hardly think it necessary to repeat what I said, for I believe that it was quite clear; but, in view of the fact that a question has been raised about what I said, I feel constrained to take the time of the Committee -- for not too long, I hope -- for that purpose.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The representative of Poland could not believe that Mr. Foster was merely saying that of course the Soviet Government knows what goes on within its own territory as far as nuclear tests are concerned. This is what Mr. Foster said "It is, of course, obvious that the Soviet Union is able to know whether seismic events on its own soil are earthquakes, but, quite frankly, we are not." (ENDC/PV.104, p.17)

Of course he meant that the United States does not know in all cases whether seismic events that take place on Soviet territory are earthquakes or nuclear explosions. He was merely saying that he assumed that the Soviet Government would have knowledge of nuclear tests conducted on Soviet territory and therefore would be sure whether an event detected by the seismic detection system of the Soviet Union was an earthquake or a nuclear explosion, but that we did not have quite as complete a knowledge about what goes on in the Soviet Union.

I should be the first to admit that, in spite of the free-enterprise system of the United States, it would be rather unlikely that a nuclear test would be conducted on United States territory without the United States Government having a pretty good idea that it was a nuclear test rather than an earthquake.

Mr. Foster did not go on to say whether or not the Soviet Union system was sufficient to identify by instrumentation alone events occurring on Soviet territory. However, Mr. Dean, in the quotation to which the representative of Bulgaria has referred, said the following. I am afraid I shall have to read it in English, but that is perhaps best since Mr. Dean delivered it in English, and I apologise to the Committee for reading it again:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain -- and I repeat, 'certain' -- of our" -- that is, United States -- "underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and, in fact, have not even been detected -- simply not detected -- by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

What Mr. Dean said was that not all of the events which took place in the United States have been identified or even detected by systems outside the United States. He did not say that all seismic events that had taken place within the United States had been detected or identified by the United States seismic detection system of instrumentation alone. In my statement I went on to say that there had in fact been underground nuclear tests mounted by the United States which, as may be seen by simply reading the data from our own instrumentation, would not have been identified as nuclear tests. Now, we obviously knew that they were, because we conducted them; but there are some tests which, by our own system and on just reading the data from our instrumentation, would not be identified as nuclear tests. Yet Mr. Tarabanov said about Mr. Dean's statement -- and perhaps there is a language difficulty here:

"In this connexion one should not forget the statement made by Mr. Dean, United States representative, in the First Committee of the General Assembly in his speech on 26 October 1962 to the effect that the United States was in a position to detect and identify with its own seismic stations any doubtful event occurring in its territory."

(ENDC/PV.105, p.36)

I submit that Mr. Tarabanov's statement was a distortion of Mr. Dean's statement, and that his logic was absurd.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all I should like to reply to the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, who in his statement today (supra, p.10) attempted to find a contradiction between the statement I made on 8 March on inspection in aseismic areas (ENDC/PV.106, p.23) and what was said on this subject in Mr. Khrushchev's reply to President Kennedy of the United States on 7 January 1963.

I fail to understand how Mr. Stelle has managed to find a contradiction. Let us look at what the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, wrote on 7 January and what I said on 8 March at the one hundred and sixth meeting. I will quote from the documents concerned.

Here is what was said on this question in the letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"It stands to reason that the most rational course would be to carry out inspections in the seismic areas in which the greatest number of unidentified seismic events are likely to occur. If, however, you consider it necessary, we would have no objection to inspections being carried out in aseismic areas also, provided that the annual quota we have indicated is not exceeded." (ENDC/73, p.8)

What did I say at our last meeting? I said:

"Mr. Stelle tried to justify this deliberately one-sided United States approach with arguments about the size of the territory of the Soviet Union. But what has the size of a territory to do with the matter? After all, you link the inspection quota to the number of seismic events. And are there not three times as many seismic events in the territory of the United States as in the territory of the Soviet Union? They why inspect a territory if it is quiet, and no earth tremors or seismic events occur there which could be confused with underground nuclear explosions?"

"There can be only one reply: the only purpose is to rummage in that territory and try to find out something that might be of interest to the United States Intelligence Service and the United States chiefs of staff". (ENDC/PV.106, p.23)

As you can see, there is no contradiction, nor can there be any, because what might be subject to inspection is not the territory as such, Mr. Stelle, but only a significant seismic event suspected of being a nuclear explosion. But aseismic areas are so called, Mr. Stelle, because seismic events do not occur there; and if they do not occur, then there is nothing to inspect. That is why the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, said in his letter --- and I will quote it to you once again, Mr. Stelle:

"It stands to reason that the most rational course would be to carry out inspections in the seismic areas in which the greatest number of unidentified seismic events are likely to occur." (ENDC/73, p.8)

That is precisely what I was saying at our last meeting. I will quote this passage once again:

"... why inspect a territory if it is quiet, and no earth tremors or seismic events occur there which could be confused with underground nuclear explosions?" (ENDC/PV.106, p.23)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That is what I said, Mr. Stelle. But if a significant seismic event which might be suspected of being a nuclear explosion should occur in an aseismic region, then, certainly, Mr. Stelle, it might become the subject of an inspection, provided of course, that the inspection was carried out within the annual quota of two to three inspections which we have indicated.

Mr. Stelle's remark about a contradiction between my statement at the last meeting and what was said in the aforementioned letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, merely shows the rather peculiar approach of the United States representative to the discussion of the question of banning nuclear weapon tests, an approach at which we can only express our regret. It is difficult, of course, to expect anything constructive when the United States has such an approach.

In our earlier discussions a lot has been said about the mistrust existing in the world between States, particularly between the Western and Eastern blocs. It has been said that it is precisely this mistrust which compels the United States to demand the greatest possible number of inspections. But the mistrust existing in the world does not at all provide any grounds for the assumption by the United States that the other side intends to cheat. Patiently trying to overcome this approach, we have passed over all these -- I would say -- unworthy polemical methods.

Having no convincing, well-founded arguments, the United States has resorted to the dubious device of discrediting the future behaviour of the other side. If the United States bases itself on the assumption that the other side cannot be trusted and that, having signed an agreement, it intends to violate it; that the other side will enter into an agreement and will put its signature to a treaty, not with the intention of conscientiously observing it, but with the aim of violating it; then what point is there in these negotiations, Mr. Stelle? After all, it is impossible to enter into an agreement with a party which you say is contemplating deceit, a secret violation of the treaty; just as it is impossible, when you are faced with a dishonest partner, to secure a guarantee that you will be able immediately to detect any violation of the treaty by him.

In its statement of 8 March the Soviet delegation quoted facts (ENDC/PV.106, p.20) to show the inconsistency of the Western Powers' attempt to involve the Eighteen

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Nation Committee in a discussion of various technical questions before agreement is reached on the quota of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations on the territory of the nuclear Powers. In spite of all their efforts, neither Mr. Stelle nor his Western colleagues have been able to refute the unquestionable conclusion that behind their insistence on the discussion of technical questions lurks the intention to avoid solving the problem of prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests. The real facts cannot be struck out. That, of course, is what the representatives of the Western Powers realize. For this reason they either try to ignore the facts or repeat without any proof that the position of the Western Powers has always been based, and continues to be based, on scientific data.

For example, the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, said:

"... the Western nuclear Powers have not ceased to base the size of the quota which they seek on a fundamental scientific assessment."  
(ENDC/PV.106, p.13)

This was said at the very time when there were laid on the Conference table statements by United States leaders directly concerned with disarmament questions, admitting that the United States position -- which has, incidentally, always been so warmly supported by the United Kingdom representative here -- was based upon an erroneous and tendentious interpretation of scientific data. Sir Paul Mason was displeased with the disrespectful attitude we were alleged to have shown towards Western scientists. I do not agree with this hasty conclusion by Sir Paul Mason. Disrespect for science is shown, not by those who draw attention to falsification in scientific experiments and scientific data, but by those who unscrupulously use this science and falsify scientific data in order to achieve certain political purposes, aimed at actually frustrating an agreement.

In order to show the real feelings of the scientists who, in spite of their personal convictions, have been called in to defend the United States position, which is opposed to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, I shall quote the words of one prominent United States theoretical physicist, Dr. Hans Bethe. We have already quoted data on how the United States Government reacted to the fact that, at a meeting of Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists held in November and December 1959, the Soviet scientists revealed (GEN/DNT/TWG 2/9, Annex 2, p8)

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the erroneousness and deliberate tendentiousness of the assembled data and conclusions of the United States experts which were aimed at minimizing the possibilities of detecting nuclear explosions, so as to justify the United States demand for the greatest possible number of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union.

For the same purpose the United States side at that meeting of experts put forward the idea of camouflaging nuclear explosions, the so-called theory of the "big cave". In order to explain why this theory was needed by the United States, it suffices to name its originator. The originator of this theory was Edward Teller, who has gained the well-deserved, very dubious reputation of being a fierce opponent of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Here is what Dr. Hans Bethe said after this meeting of Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists. I quote him word for word:

"I had the doubtful honour of describing to the Russians the theory of the 'big cave' or 'big hole'. I felt very uneasy while I was doing so, because the meaning of the theory was that we were considering the Russians capable of large-scale cheating. I believe they had every reason to consider this an insult and to walk out of the Committee room".

These words were spoken by a United States scientist with a world-wide reputation, who is one of the greatest specialists in the theory of nuclear physics.

It remains to be added that all this theory of the "big cave" was tried in practice. An experiment was carried out. I am referring to the shot carried out in the United States on 10 December 1961 in the salt mines of New Mexico. When the United States was preparing this shot, as the United States representatives have told us here, the time and place were allegedly announced beforehand. It turned out that this shot was detected far beyond the boundaries of the United States, whereas the originators of the theory of the "big cave" had calculated that this shot would not be recorded anywhere, and they had even announced the time in order the more effectively to present this result before the whole world. But since it turned out that this shot was recorded at many points of the globe many thousands of kilometres from the site of the shot, the United States now says to us: "Well, we announced beforehand the time of this shot" --- that is to say, it is beating a retreat.

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One can say that those United States scientists who engage in such experiments have succeeded in one thing only, not in science but in a political matter: they have prevented and are continuing to prevent progress in our negotiations, the aim of which is the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The United States speakers in these negotiations follow the tactics mentioned in the well-known story about a thief who stole someone's money and, in order to put pursuers off the track, ran through the crowd in the market square pointing in front of him and shouting at the top of his voice: "Stop, thief!"

This story accurately describes the real state of affairs. Everyone knows that the United States alone is carrying out underground nuclear weapon tests. Its allies, the United Kingdom and France, are also engaged in this business, although on a smaller scale than the United States. True, there have already been reports that France, contemptuously ignoring both the resolutions of the General Assembly and the protests of the peoples, particularly of the African peoples -- that is, acting in conformity with the United States line on this question -- will shortly carry out another underground nuclear explosion in the Hoggar.

But the Soviet Union is not carrying out any underground tests. Gentlemen, just look at the farce which the United States representatives are playing here. They argue about the number of inspections which the United States would like to carry out in the Soviet Union. Before signing any agreement with us, they already speak of the Soviet Union as a violator of the treaty. They speak of the deterrent effect of inspections and so forth. But who has given the United States the right, or what has given the United States any cause, to indulge in such false and discreditable speculations -- namely that the Soviet Union, having signed a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, will start carrying out underground nuclear weapon tests, which before concluding the agreement it did not carry out -- and to build its position on this dubious and degraded foundation?

If we are to indulge in such unscrupulous speculations, Mr. Stelle, then the Soviet Union, with its very advanced rocket techniques and instruments for programmed electronic remote guidance, can far more easily carry out a series of secret atomic explosion on the other side of the moon, for instance, by sending there missiles with nuclear warheads. After all, the United States could not detect a nuclear explosion on the other side of the moon with its national means of control.

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Nevertheless, the United States has proposed on its own initiative that we should agree on the prohibition of tests in outer space without any international control whatever. So in this case it relies upon the good faith of the Soviet Union, and is prepared to come to an agreement on the prohibition of tests in outer space without any inspection and without international control.

Then why, Mr. Stelle, do you take such an extreme position on the question of prohibiting underground explosions, and say that even with two to three inspections a year you will not agree to the prohibition of underground explosions, whereas you are prepared to agree to the prohibition of nuclear tests in outer space without any inspection and without any kind of international control, although everyone realizes that there are more favourable conditions for secret nuclear tests in outer space than underground, if one takes the approach adopted by the United States? There is a simple explanation for such a difference in the positions of the United States in these two cases: the United States obviously is not in a position to carry out nuclear weapon tests in outer space, say, on the other side of the moon, but the Soviet Union can do so; that is why the United States willingly agrees to the prohibition of these tests without any inspection and without any international control. In this case it does not question the good faith of the Soviet Union it does not demand adequate inspection and effective international control, nor does it speak of the restraining, deterrent effect of inspection.

The United States takes a completely different attitude to underground nuclear weapon tests. In this field the United States has made considerable progress. The United States Atomic Energy Commission announced on 30 January 1963 -- that is, just over a month ago -- that its extensive programme of underground tests in Nevada for the creation of a new atomic weapon had been completely successful. The Commission recognized with obvious satisfaction that underground tests were yielding ever greater results, in particular for the creation of low-yield weapons. It is obvious to us that at present the United States is not inclined to renounce underground nuclear tests, and is covering this up with speculations as false as they are discreditable to the effect that the Soviet Union, which up to now has not carried out underground nuclear weapon tests, would start carrying them out secretly after signing a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, including those underground.

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Precisely these false and baseless suppositions are being used by the United States to explain its extreme position, which is destroying the prospects of an agreement. There is not a grain of science in this position; it is political speculation and nothing else. But when Mr. Stelle dealt with the question of seismic and aseismic areas, referring to the statement which I made at our last meeting, he did not reply to the question why the United States demands the same number of inspections for the Soviet Union and for the United States, whereas at least three times as many seismic events occur in the territory of the United States as in the territory of the Soviet Union. Here again this attitude of the United States shows with particular cogency that the United States is seeking to secure decisions which would be favourable for United States intelligence activities.

The representative of Canada expressed today his concern at the standstill in our present negotiations. We certainly do not doubt the sincerity of the Canadian representative's concern at the situation which has come about in our negotiations. But in that case, Mr. Burns, try to help our cause and bring some influence to bear on your principal Western partner, the United States; because this situation has come about solely as a result of the United States position and no one else is to blame for it.

To sum up the existing situation, we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that all the attempts of the Western Powers to involve our Committee in new technical discussions without prior solution of the question of the inspection quota and the number of automatic seismic stations are nothing but a diversionary manoeuvre, an attempt to avoid altogether the political solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by replacing this solution with fruitless discussions on technical, organizational, administrative, financial and other aspects of the problem of control. We know from experience that, every time the United States has been short of arguments to back up its political position, it has put forward various technical considerations and insisted on technical discussions. We are firmly opposed to the main basic questions being replaced by technical and other secondary aspects and details, and to the use of these to frustrate such important political

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decisions as those concerning the quota of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations, so that the solution of the question of the cessation of tests would be lost in a maze of endless and fruitless technical and other discussions on secondary questions.

The United States cannot justify its position. We have already mentioned the United States position in regard to national forms of control. I would remind you that on 25 October 1962 -- that is, four months ago -- the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, told the Sub-Committee that the proposal for the use of national forms of control over underground nuclear explosions --

"... is patently scientifically inadequate..." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.39, p.4)

At the same meeting of the Sub-Committee we pointed out that Mr. Stelle's assertion was baseless, unsubstantiated and contrary to the facts.

On 22 February Mr. Stelle said something quite different (ENDC/PV.101, p.42). He said that the United States was now relying on national systems of control and that in this regard it had no disagreement with the Soviet Union. You see the kind of science the United States representative has. In only a few months he has made an about-turn in evaluating national systems of control. In October 1962 national systems were considered by the United States representative to be unsuitable from the scientific point of view, yet two or three months later the United States is already relying upon national systems, although during those two or three months nothing extraordinary happened in science which would have provided a reason for such an about-turn in the United States' evaluation of these forms of control. Consequently the references of the United States representatives to science were unfounded when they were trying last October to reject the Soviet proposal for the use of national systems as the basis of control as unsuitable from the scientific point of view.

Obviously in reality science had nothing to do with the matter. These zigzags in the United States position are determined, as you see, not by science but by political considerations, by the political line which the United States is taking on this question. Therefore, representatives of the Western Powers, stop your filibustering, which you are covering up with false references to science.

At our last meeting I pointed out that the capabilities of control over underground nuclear explosions would be improved in the very near future. In addition to the method of detecting underground nuclear explosions by measuring their

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effect on the earth's magnetic field, and other methods which I mentioned at our last meeting, new effective means such as digital magnetic recording, spectral analysis, statistical methods and so on have recently made their appearance. As seismology has developed, there have been established new simple signs making it possible to differentiate between underground explosions and natural earthquakes according to the spectrum of longitudinal waves, the relative intensity of different waves, the reduction of energy with distance, and other factors. The existing methods, including the recently-devised methods of differentiating between nuclear explosions and earthquakes, practically do away with all the difficulties connected with distinguishing weak waves against a background of interference, and this, of course, makes it possible effectively to control low-yield underground nuclear explosions at great distances.

However, the United States position in this matter is such that the greater the capabilities prove to be, the more violent become its far-fetched and baseless doubts. But it is not a question of doubts now. We now have every possibility for an agreement. In this connexion I should like to recall the statement of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nilsson, who, speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 19 October 1962, said:

"The development of technical resources for the detection of tests has proceeded most rapidly." (A/C.1/PV.1252, p.16)

"We may further note that the technical" -- I call the attention of members to these words -- "We may further note that the technical basis of an agreement on a test ban now exists in all essential respects."

(ibid. pp.12-15)

But that was said by the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Soviet Union agreed to a quota of two to three inspections a year and before the Soviet Union agreed to the installation of three automatic seismic stations. Now that the Soviet Union has agreed to a quota of two to three inspections a year and to the installation of three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers, the position of the United States and its Western allies, who demand new concessions from the Soviet Union, has become all the less defensible. Everyone realizes, everyone knows that it is for the United States to act. We shall, of course, study carefully today's statement by the representative of the United States and the representative of Canada, and if necessary we shall give further replies.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I shall want to study what has been said this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, and I shall make replies to such points as warrant reply at a later meeting; but there are a few things which I think should be said immediately.

Mr. Tsarapkin laboured heavily the theme that the United States had no right to be in any way suspicious of what the Soviet Union might do after a treaty was signed. I think, in fact, he went so far as to say that, if we had any such suspicions, there was no point in our being here for negotiations. It is a fact of life that there is distrust between our two nations and that in the treaty which we sincerely hope we shall achieve, which bears directly on the vital security interests of both of us, there must be adequate arrangements so that each of us is assured that the obligations we ourselves have undertaken are being adhered to by the other side. I think that perhaps all that needs to be said on that argument by Mr. Tsarapkin is to quote again what has been frequently quoted in our Committee and is particularly apposite to what the Soviet representative had to say today. I will quote two sentences from the statement made by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the second meeting of our Committee:

"Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least of all States which have established closed military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament." (ENDC/PV.2, p.11)

Mr. Tsarapkin again charged that the United States, in its request for negotiations on the arrangements for on-site inspections in order to know whether inspections would be effective or not, was trying to delay our progress towards a treaty, or to block our progress towards a treaty. But we frankly are somewhat puzzled by the statements of the Soviet representative and his allies of the Eastern bloc on this question of arrangements. Sometimes we are given to believe that there are no real problems, that once the number of a quota of on-site inspections has been agreed, everything will fall into place and agreement will be easy and rapid. Then again we are told that the long history of negotiations on just such arrangements indicates the difficulties in arriving at agreement on them, and that such negotiations will

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therefore take a long time. Well, whichever may be the case -- and we sincerely hope it will be, and we believe it should be, the former -- certainly it is time to get to work and start discussing and negotiating on these arrangements, because, as our Secretary of State said the other day, we do not need to know or agree to just a number; what we must find out about and what we must agree about is the number of what: what are we talking about, what kind of inspections? Let us talk about the what as well as the number.

The Soviet representative and his Eastern colleagues, while maintaining that discussion of general arrangements for inspection or the other general parameters of the treaty will take time and delay us, are quite content to take up the time of this Committee with very detailed technical discussions, many of them in fact complete repetition of discussions that have been held previously in the test ban Conference and in the Sub-Committee. I might cite an example. The Soviet representative referred today to a tired accusation -- which, as a matter of fact, he himself has withdrawn -- that the Gnome shot undertaken by the United States in a salt bed in New Mexico was an attempt by the United States to prove that the decoupling theory, the big hole theory, would work, and that we were attempting to show by giving the time of the shot to stations all over the world, some of which we had helped with equipment, that the shot would not be observed, and that the fact that it was observed disproved the decoupling, or big hole, theory.

Without going too far into technical details, the Gnome shot did as a matter of fact disprove one theoretical calculation which had previously been made: that was a theoretical calculation that tamped shots -- shots right next to the material in which they are exploded -- which took place in salt would give weaker signals than shots which took place in Nevada tuff. The Gnome shot did prove on an experimental basis that the reverse was the case: that a tamped shot in the salt gave a seismic signal stronger, by a factor of perhaps two or three, than a tamped shot in Nevada tuff. But that shot was a tamped shot. It was not a decoupled shot, and Mr. Tsarapkin said as much on 19 October in the nuclear Sub-Committee. When I expressed my happiness that he had finally admitted that the Gnome shot was not carried out in decoupling conditions, he said:

"But you are happy to no purpose, Mr. Stelle. I never asserted that the Gnome shot was carried out in decoupling conditions." (ENDC/SC.1/PV.37, p.23)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Yet we have this same old story that somehow or other the United States was trying to deceive the world by a decoupled shot, and that it failed in its alleged deception.

Mr. Tsarapkin went into other technical aspects of a treaty. He soared into outer space. I do not propose to follow him there today, although certain of the statements he made were inaccurate and may have to be replied to. However, we very much wish that, since the Soviet representative is quite willing, along with his colleagues, to take up the time of the Committee in discussing technical details, he would proceed to the much more general arrangements which we need to discuss and to agree upon before we can know that we are agreeing to something. We need to know, when we talk about numbers, numbers of what.

I have just one further remark. I was happy to find from Mr. Tsarapkin's elaboration of a remark he made concerning inspections in aseismic territories -- a remark which I had found somewhat ambiguous -- that he actually did mean that, if there were a tremor or a seismic event in an aseismic area, he would consider that that would be an event which would be liable to inspection. Therefore I am very glad to admit that Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, as he explained it, was quite consistent with the quotation from the letter of Mr. Khrushchev, even though Mr. Tsarapkin does not as yet seem to be quite on all fours with Mr. Gromyko.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I have still two more speakers on my list. I fervently hope they will be the last.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French) I shall not detail the members of the Committee for more than a minute, particularly in view of your last remark, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to say, first of all, that we shall study very carefully the statements made today by the United States representative. We feel that there will certainly be much to say on the subject, since the arguments he presented today are in flagrant contradiction with other arguments advanced by the United States delegation in the past.

But I should like now to emphasize again what he himself emphasized with much insistence in referring (supra, p.9) to the statement made by the United States representative in the First Committee of the General Assembly that the United States delegation is entitled to interpret its own statements as it wishes and draw its own conclusions from them. It is the master of its own interpretations, just as the

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other delegations which read these statements can draw their own conclusions and interpretations. Let me simply repeat what the United States representative, Mr. Dean, himself said:

"Although it is a well-publicized fact that stations in other countries have recorded certain -- and I repeat, certain -- of our underground nuclear explosions, there have been many other explosions which have not been identified as nuclear explosions and, in fact, have not even been detected simply not detected -- by scientific stations and observatories outside the United States." (A/C.1/PV.1255, p.26)

I repeat: "outside the United States". He did not specifically say on that occasion that stations in the United States were able to detect these explosions, but merely emphasized that the others were not able to do so. We must therefore be allowed to draw our own conclusions.

I am sure that the members of the Committee have drawn their own conclusions from this. No doubt many of them are reluctant to express them for fear of incurring criticism from the United States and having all kinds of aspersions cast upon their logic. I think that perhaps .... or even certainly -- they will act as they see fit; but they will already have an idea of what is meant by the words "outside the United States".

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I apologize for taking up the time of the Committee at this late hour, but I cannot leave the statement of the United States representative unanswered. I shall be brief.

The quotation from a speech made by Foreign Minister Gromyko is beside the point, Mr. Stelle. Mr. Gromyko was speaking of disarmament. A treaty on disarmament is precisely the kind of treaty or agreement which is unthinkable without control. Disarmament measures must be controlled. So in quoting Mr. Gromyko you are beating on an open door. We have never disputed the need for control over disarmament, and will always be in favour of control, in favour of disarmament.

In regard to the cessation of nuclear tests, Mr. Stelle: the United States itself put forward a proposal to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space without any inspection or international control (ENDC/59). And now the battle going on here is only over the question of control over underground explosions. But a dispute even on such a plane

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is baseless, because we agree to control in respect of underground explosions, if only for the sake of reaching agreement with you. We agree to this although for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests neither inspection nor international control is needed. That is the point. The quotation you adduced, Mr. Stelle, is all the less relevant because we agree to two to three inspections and to the installation of automatic seismic stations.

And now a few words about the Gnome shot. Mr. Stelle, in 1959 your scientists stated -- and next time I shall bring the verbatim record in English to show to all the members of the Committee in order to put an end once and for all to these deliberate distortions on your part -- in 1959, in Technical Working Group 2, your scientific experts (and I can cite their names) stated that, if an underground nuclear explosion were carried out in a big hole excavated in a salt layer or in hard volcanic tuff, the seismic effect would be reduced by a factor of 300 (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9, p.3); but if the shot were made without a hole and right next to the layer, the seismic effect would be reduced by a factor of three or more. That is what your own scientists said. It is on the record, Mr. Stelle.

But what did your scientific experts say after the Gnome explosion? After the Gnome explosion your specialists began to say that, if an explosion were carried out in a salt layer or in volcanic tuff, the seismic effect would be increased by a factor of two. That is the point. Their conclusions in 1959 and their conclusions after the Gnome shot were in direct contradiction.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and seventh plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Barrington, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Poland, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 13 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.



